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Robert Leckey*
Highlighting the family home's significance as shelter this paper challenges
the prevailing view of the demands of the equality guarantee in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms regarding unmarried cohabitants. In Nova Scotia
(Attorney General) v. Walsh, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the claim
that it was discriminatory to restrict rules dividing matrimonial property to married
couples. By contrast, on many views it is discriminatory to exclude cohabitants
from a support obligation. Scholars and judges assume that Walsh upholds all
statutory rules regarding married spouses and their property, including measures
protecting the family home as shelter But Walsh is best read narrowly leaving
open the status of the latter rules. Viewed in the light of the support/property
dichotomy, the regime of the family home is akin to support. For family law and
policy, it is analytically useful to unbundle conjugal unions' effects. Scholars'
reading of Walsh may connect to procedural features of Charter litigation and
attitudes towards judicial power inconsistent with the common-law tradition.
En mettant en lumibre Iimportance de la r6sidence familiale comme refuge,
cet article questionne la conception dominante des exigences concernant les
conjoints de fait quant 1 la garantie d'6galit6 de la Charte canadienne des droits
et liberths. Dans Nouvelle-Ecosse (Procureur g6ndral) c. Walsh, la Cour suprdme
du Canada a rejet6 la pr6tention selon laquelle la limitation des r~gles de division
des biens familiaux aux couples marids dtait discriminatoire. En comparaison,
il pourrait 6tre discriminatoire d'exclure les conjoints de fait de lobligation
alimentaire. Les chercheurs et les juges supposent que Walsh maintient la validit6
de toutes les ragles Idgislatives concernant les conjoints marids et leurs biens,
y compris les mesures protdgeant le refuge qu'est la r6sidence familiale. Walsh
gagne toutefois & 6tre lu de manidre 4troite, prdservant la question de la validit6
de ces dernidres r~gles. A la lumidre de la dichotomie obligation de support/
partage des biens familiaux, le rdgime de la rdsidence familiale est apparent6
j celui des aliments. Tant sur le plan du droit de la famille que sur celui des
politiques publiques, il est analytiquement utile de ddm~ler les effets des unions
conjugales. Les aspects proc6duraux des litiges sous la Charte et les attitudes
j l'endroit du pouvoirjudiciaires ont-ils impr6gnds la lecture de Walsh faite par la
doctrine, par ailleurs incompatibles avec la tradition de common law?
* Associate Professor and William Dawson Scholar, Faculty of Law, and Acting Director, Quebec
Research Centre of Private and Comparative Law, McGill University. This research was supported
by the Wainwright Fund of McGill University and by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council. I acknowledge the excellent research assistance of Alexander Steinhouse. For comments on
earlier versions, I am indebted to Eric Adams, Veronica Ashenhurst, Kim Brooks, Justina Di Fazio,
Patrick Glenn, Nicholas Kasirer, Dennis Klinck, Mary Jane Mossman, Carol Rogerson, Lionel Smith,
Stephen Smith, Alexander Steinhouse, Rollie Thompson, and Priyanka Timblo. An earlier version was
presented at a faculty seminar at the Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, and I am grateful
for feedback received there.
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Introduction
Should the family homes of unmarried cohabitants be treated differently
from their other property? Should they be protected as shelter, as are the
homes of married spouses? Efforts to reform family law for unmarried
cohabitants typically proceed by asking whether to extend the rights and
duties of married spouses to them, and if so, how fully. As detailed below,
the provincial laboratories of the Canadian federation have produced a
range of legislative responses to that inquiry. The spectrum runs from
according no matrimonial rights and duties to unmarried cohabitants
(in Quebec) to total assimilation with married spouses (in Manitoba and
Saskatchewan). Between those poles stands legislative extension of a right
and duty of spousal support to unmarried cohabitants while reserving to
married spouses the regime of matrimonial property. Determining sound
family policy for unmarried cohabitants involves multiple factors. One
is the balance between protection against exploitation and respect for
autonomy; another, that between "duality and unity in conjugality."' The
Supreme Court of Canada's recognition of marital status as "analogous"
to the suspect grounds in the equality guarantee of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms has added constitutional obligation as another
factor.2
Relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's treatment of marital status
under the Charter, provincial appellate courts have accepted that it was
unconstitutional for a spousal-support regime and a regime of matrimonial
property not to extend their respective benefits (and burdens) to unmarried
I. Nicholas Kasirer, "The Dance Is One" in Sylvio Normand, ed, Milanges offerts au professeur
Frangois Frenette: itudes portant sur le droit patrimonial (Qu6bec: Presses de l'Universit6 Laval,
2006) 13 at 28.
2. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c II [Charter]; Miron v Trudel, [1995] 2 SCR 418.
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cohabitants. In at least partial reliance on the latter judgment, the
legislatures of Manitoba and Saskatchewan included cohabitants within
their regimes of matrimonial property.' Then, in Nova Scotia (Attorney
General) v. Walsh,' the Supreme Court of Canada overturned the Court of
Appeal. It upheld the distinction between married and unmarried couples
in defeat of a claim for asset division under Nova Scotia's matrimonial
property legislation. That decision seems to have lessened the pressure
for legislative reform.6 No legislature has since amended its regime of
matrimonial property to include cohabitants, although at the time of
writing one is considering it, absent constitutional compulsion.'
The legislative initiatives and Charter cases mentioned here have
familiarized judges and scholars with the distinction between spousal
support and property. A prevailing understanding takes Walsh as having
approved the exclusion ofunmarried couples from all "property" provisions
under provincial family law. Those provisions include rules dividing
property and protective measures bearing on the matrimonial home, be
it owned, leased, or otherwise held.' Some protective measures operate
during the conjugal union. Thus where one spouse holds the interest in the
family home, the other has nevertheless a right to possession. Moreover,
the title-holding spouse must obtain the other spouse's consent in order
to charge or dispose of an interest in the home. Another measure operates
after separation: a court may award exclusive possession of the home, on
a short- or long-term basis, to the spouse who does not hold title.
3. Taylor v Rossu, 1998 ABCA 193, 161 DLR (4th) 266; Walsh v Bona, 2000 NSCA 53, 183 NSR
(2d) 74 [Walsh CA].
4. The Family Property Act, CCSM c F25, ss 13, 14; Family Property Act, SS 1997, c F-6.3, ss 4,
21(1), 22(l), as am. by An Act to amend certain Statutes respecting Domestic Relations (No. 2), SS
2001, c 51, s 8(5). In Saskatchewan an unappealed trial judgment had concluded that the province's
rules regarding the family home violated s 15(1) for excluding unmarried cohabitants. Watch v Watch
(1999), 182 Sask R 237 (Unif'd Fam Ct).
5. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Walsh, 2002 SCC 83, [2002] 4 SCR 325 [Walsh SCC].
6. Berend Hovius, "Property Rights for Common-Law Partners" in Martha Shaffer, ed,
Contemporary Issues in Family Law: Engaging with the Legacy of James G. McLeod (Toronto:
Carswell, 2007) 115 at 127.
7. British Columbia Ministry of Attorney General, Justice Services Branch, Civil Policy and
Legislation Office, White Paper on Family Relations Act Reform: Proposals for a New Family Law
Act (July 2010) at 83-84, online: <http://www.ag.gov.bc.callegislation/pdf/Family-Law-White-Paper.
pdf>.
8. The paper refers interchangeably to the "matrimonial home," "family home," and "family
residence." Variation in the legislative use of the adjectives does not track the rules' scope of
application; for example, Quebec's regime on the "family residence" applies only to married and
civil-union spouses. Inclusive terms avoid begging the question that this paper aims to prise open. On
the abstract and physical connotations of "home," said to have no equivalent in the Latin or Slavic
European languages, see Witold Rybczynski, Home: A Short History of an Idea (New York: Penguin
Books, 1986) at 62.
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This paper argues that, within the category of matrimonial property,
rules on the family home and on division of assets are distinguishable
for Charter purposes. It is appropriate to break up the family home, so to
speak, unbundling rules that address its role as shelter from those which
allocate its economic value with that of other assets. Rules protecting
the family home as shelter are rightly viewed as rooted not in property,
but in support, in the sense of their focus on needs and protection. They
are what civilian scholars would call alimentary in nature. Whereas rules
on division of assets embody corrective justice, allocating the spouses'
respective entitlements as equal partners in a joint economic enterprise,
rules on the family home embody distributive justice. The better reading
of Walsh views the constitutionality of reserving special treatment of the
family home for married spouses as not yet fully considered and decided by
the Supreme Court. Accordingly, in Nova Scotia or elsewhere, a Charter
challenge regarding the family home on the basis of marital status might
proceed unimpeded by the contention that Walsh has decided the matter.9
Put otherwise, this paper aims to clear away a mistaken understanding
of the scope of decided law at the intersection of family law and the
Charter, laying bare the vocation and character of rules which address
the family home as shelter. It deploys conventional techniques of close
reading and conceptual reasoning. But its means should not obscure the
stakes. The potential beneficiaries of this enterprise are economically
vulnerable women and children, including those who have experienced
domestic violence. If one aim is to open a space that might prove fruitful in
litigation, another is to stimulate scholars and policy makers to view afresh
the effects of conjugal unions, perhaps with a view to disaggregating them.
The paper does not sketch the affirmative case that excluding unmarried
spouses from rules relating to the family home infringes s. 15(1) of the
Charter, although its operating assumption is that the equality analysis
might well come out differently than it did in Walsh. The majority in
Walsh had noted the "significant heterogeneity" of unmarried couples."o
In contrast, those who would actually deploy the protective regime of
the family home, but for their marital status, presumably form a more
homogeneous group. They are likely women with the custody of minor
children.
9. Alternatively, it is arguable that, whatever Walsh decided about marital status, it did not render
resjudicata the discrimination claim that might be framed for children on the basis of their parents'
marital status.
10. Supra note 5 at para 39.
Gimme Shelter
The argument unfolds in five parts. Part I summarizes Walsh and
characterizes the prevailing readings of it as wide. Part 1I presents the
special character of the family home and situates the argument in relation
to recent judgments. Successive parts advocate for the narrow reading by
which Walsh determined only the constitutionality of the rules impeding
the claim for a share of assets. Drawing on the materials submitted to
the court, the transcript of the hearing, and the majority reasons, Part
III makes the case that the constitutionality of denying cohabitants the
protections accorded the matrimonial home has not been fully argued and
considered. Part IV lays out the conceptual and legislative differences
between the division of assets and protection of the family home as
shelter. Finally, Part V tentatively suggests that the scholarly and judicial
readings of Walsh arose from practices of adjudication and of reading
Charter judgments inconsistent with traditional common-law methods.
Since Charter principles apply across the federation, the argument relies
on legislative and doctrinal examples from the civil law of Quebec as well
as from the common law of the other provinces and territories.
I. Readings of Walsh
Walsh concerned the treatment of unmarried, cohabiting partners under
Nova Scotia's family law. The legislature of Nova Scotia had already
extended its discretionary regime of spousal support to "common-law
partners."" But as its title implies, the Province's Matrimonial Property
Act applies only to "spouses," defined in relation to valid, voidable, or
void marriages.' 2 Between the second and third levels of court in Walsh, an
amendment had also attached the rights and obligations of a "spouse" under
the MPA to declared domestic partners." The MPA defines "matrimonial
assets" and sets out the entitlement of each "spouse" to an equal share
of the matrimonial assets, title to them notwithstanding. 4 It establishes
protections in relation to the "matrimonial home," including an equal right
of possession during the marriage, a disability on the part of either spouse
unilaterally to encumber or dispose of a matrimonial home, and discretion
for a court to confer on one spouse exclusive possession of a matrimonial
home for life or a lesser period."
I1. Maintenance and Custody Act, RSNS 1989, c 160, s 2(aa).
12. Matrimonial Property Act, RSNS 1989, c 275, s 2(g) [MPA].
13. Law Reform (2000) Act, SNS 2000, c 29, amending, inter alia, the Vital Statistics Act, RSNS
1989, c 494, s 54(2)(g).
14. MPA, supra note 12, ss 4, 12.
15. Ibid, ss 6(1), 8(1), 1 l(1)(a).
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Susan Walsh cohabited with Wayne Bona for ten years and they had
two children during the relationship. She and Bona owned a home as
joint tenants, which led to the sharing of its value under the general law
of property. At the time of separation Bona had assets with a net value
of $66,000. Walsh claimed support for herself and the two children. In
addition, she sought an equal division of "matrimonial assets." Her claim
did not involve the MPA's rules on the matrimonial home. As a preliminary
matter, Walsh contended that the definition of "spouse" discriminated
against her on the basis of marital status, contrary to the equality guarantee
in the Charter.
The chambers judge, assuming the truthfulness of the facts in Walsh's
affidavit, ruled against her.16 The Court of Appeal reversed, finding
discrimination." The provincial government sought leave to appeal to
the Supreme Court of Canada. The litigation seemed of obvious national
interest. Each province in Canada had legislated for married spouses a
presumptive rule of equal sharing.'" In most provinces, such sharing did
not apply to unmarried cohabitants. The nine common-law provinces had
also extended their regimes of spousal support to unmarried cohabitants.
By contrast, the book on the family in the Civil Code of Qudbec imposes
no reciprocal obligations on defacto spouses.19 Could a legislature, having
recognized the functional similarity of married and unmarried couples for
some purposes, rely on marital status to distinguish them for others? It
was presumably with those elements in mind that leave was granted, and
the Chief Justice stated a constitutional question as to whether s. 2(g) of
the MPA "discriminate[d] against heterosexual unmarried cohabitants
contrary to s. 15(1) of the Charter." Although Walsh's counsel advised
the Court prior to the hearing that she and Bona had settled their property
dispute, the appeal proceeded.
At the Supreme Court of Canada, eight judges allowed the provincial
government's appeal, answering the constitutional question in the negative.
Where legislation "dramatically" alters the legal obligations of partners
towards one another, wrote Bastarache J. for the majority, "choice must be
paramount." 20 On that view, many persons in circumstances similar to those
of the parties have chosen to avoid marriage and its legal consequences.
16. Walsh v Bona (1999), 178 NSR (2d) 151 (SC) [Walsh SC].
17. Walsh CA, supra note 3.
18. Julien D Payne & Marilyn A Payne, Canadian Family Law, 3d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) at
564-65, n 4.
19. Interpretation Act, RSQ c 1-16, s 61.1: "Two persons of opposite sex or the same sex who live
together and represent themselves publicly as a couple are defacto spouses regardless, except where
otherwise provided, of how long they have been living together."
20. Walsh, supra note 5 at para 43.
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One judge, agreeing with the majority that excluding unmarried couples
from a matrimonial property regime was permissible, distinguished the
respective legal bases for spousal support and matrimonial property.
For Gonthier J., spousal support, legislatively imposed, is needs-based
and fulfills a social objective; the division of matrimonial property is
contractual, a core incident of the free exchange of consent on marriage. 21
In dissent, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. denied any distinction between property
and support. On her assessment, both helped individuals to satisfy
basic financial needs following the end of an intimate, economically
interdependent relationship. 22
Relevant for present purposes is that the understandings of Walsh vary.
Many commentators adopt what can be called the wide reading, namely,
that it is constitutional to restrict the entirety of the MPA to married
spouses. It is said that Walsh determined that unmarried cohabitants cannot
invoke the Charter's equality guarantee regarding the generic category of
"statutory property rights."2 3 That view is consistent with the majority's
general pronouncement about s. 2(g). But it takes Walsh as having gone
further than necessary to dispose of the claim to share the value of assets.
Other instances of the wide reading are finer-grained. They
acknowledge the other features of the MPA for which the definition of
"spouse" served as gatekeeper. Critics of the judgment in common-law
Canada underline the stability and security that exclusive possession of
the matrimonial home can furnish to women and children on relationship
breakdown. In those scholars' view, the severe potential impact of that
mechanism's unavailability grounds an objection to the judgment.24
Similarly, some commentators in Quebec take for granted that the majority
judgment upheld the exclusion of de facto spouses from rules on the
family residence as well as on asset division. They do so while doubting
the wisdom of the status quo thus affirmed.25 Scholars who stress the
importance of possession of the family home after a relationship break-up
nevertheless assume that the constitutionality of restricting that possibility
to married spouses is settled law.
21. Ibid at paras 203-04.
22. ]bid at para 103.
23. Payne & Payne, supra note 18 at 57.
24. Carol Rogerson, "Developments in Family Law: The 2002-2003 Term" (2003) 22 Supreme
Court LR (2d) 273 at 287-88, n 34; DA Rollie Thompson, "Walsh v Bona: Annotated" (2003) 32 RFL
(5th) 87 at 92.
25. Michel T6trault, Droit de lafamille, 4th ed (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 2010) vol 1 at 865; Jean
Pineau & Marie Pratte, Lafamille (Montreal: Th6mis, 2006) at para 379; and Dominique Goubau,
Ghislain Otis & David Robitaille, "La spdcificit6 patrimoniale de l'union de fait: le libre choix et ses
'dommages collat6raux"' (2003) 44 C de D 3 at 51.
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Of scholars who mention the MPA 's core provisions separately, only one
questions the assumption that Walsh established the validity of excluding
unmarried spouses from family-home protections. Even then, it is literally
a question. Hovius notes that "the court did not expressly consider the
rights of possession in a family residence." Is it inferable, he asks in "Notes
and Questions," that there is no constitutional obligation to extend the
protections of the matrimonial home to unmarried cohabitants?26 Nobody
has expressly attended to the judgment's holding or aimed to circumscribe
it, contrasting the broad pronouncements with the determination necessary
to dispose of Susan Walsh's claim.
With an eye on the MPA's attention to asset division and to protecting
the matrimonial home as shelter, the wide reading can be understood
two ways. One is that two Charter questions regarding cohabitants are
separable: issue A relates to asset division; issue B, to the matrimonial
home. On this understanding, A and B might share some concerns and
separately raise others. Along this line, the Supreme Court of Canada in
Walsh considered and decided issues A and B. On the other, the provisions
of the MA form an indivisible ensemble [A + B], which the majority
upheld.
To be sure, other commentators focus on the majority's exclusion
of unmarried cohabitants from the equal division of assets without
mentioning the challenged law's other provisions.27 They speak of Walsh
as if the majority had affirmed the constitutionality of the definition of
"spouse" as married spouse in relation to ss. 4 and 12, the provisions on
matrimonial assets. Such a focus-call it the narrow reading-flows from
the initial claim. But it derogates enough from the question announced and
answered in the negative by the Supreme Court as to require analytical
work. Neither those adopting the wide reading-however critically-nor
those subscribing to the narrow have viewed the judgment's precedential
meaning as an open question, one inviting rigorous assessment.
26. Berend Hovius & Mary-Jo Maur, Hovius on Family Law: Cases, Notes and Materials, 7th ed
(Toronto: Carswell, 2009) at 374.
27. See e.g. Pineau & Pratte, supra note 25 at para 379; Nicholas Bala, "Controversy over Couples in
Canada: The Evolution of Marriage and Other Adult Interdependent Relationships" (2003) 29 Queen's
LJ 41 at 51-55; Mary Jane Mossman, Families and the Law in Canada: Cases and Commentary
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2004) at 391; Graeme G Mitchell, "Developments in Constitutional
Law: The 2002-2003 Term: A Tale of Two Courts" (2003) 22 Supreme Court LR (2d) 83 at 122-28;
Hester Lessard, "Charter Gridlock: Equality Formalism and Marriage Fundamentalism" (2006) 33
Supreme Court LR (2d) 291 at 305; and Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed, loose-
leaf (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) vol I at 27-11.
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II. Home's significance andjudicial context
This part briefly introduces the family home of married and unmarried
partners and the complexities of legally acknowledging its significance. By
reference to recent litigation, it confirms the importance of distinguishing
relevantly different regimes and delineating the scope of Walsh.
Materials from Canada as well as from France and the United Kingdom
emphasize the significance of the family home, in most cases defined in
relation to marriage. Its role as asset-often the family's biggest, although
a pension may compete for that distinction-is distinguished from its role
as shelter,28 "the place around which family life revolves."29 As shelter, the
family home "connotes safety, security, continuity, a sense of place and
even of identity."3 0 A spouse who has functioned as a full-time homemaker
during the relationship might develop a particularly deep emotional
attachment to the home.' The abidingly gendered division of labour
within many different-sex couples makes that observation most applicable
to women. In the aboriginal context, a home on a reserve may be a woman
and her children's sole access "to their culture, language and family."32
Quebec's rules are said to protect "le cadre de vie de la famille en raison de
son importance matdrielle et affective pour les 6poux," 3 to recognize the
home as "essential" to the family's "stability and fulfillment."34 This sense
of the family home's social importance aligns with recent anthropological
work on how "kinship is produced in houses, through the intimate sharing
of space, food, and nurturance."I' Sociologists connect the concept of home
to "the way in which people experience and make their relationships."36
28. Loma Fox, Conceptualising Home: Theories, Laws and Policies (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2007) at 25-27 [Fox, Conceptualising Home].
29. Berend Hovius & Timothy G Youdan, The Law of Family Property (Scarborough: Thomson,
1991) at 574.
30. Heather Conway & Philip Girard, "'No Place Like Home': The Search for a Legal Framework
for Cohabitants and the Family Home in Canada and Britain" (2005) 30 Queen's LJ 715 at 716
[Conway & Girard, "'No Place Like Home']; see also Isabelle Corpart, Les rigimes matrimoniaux,
2d ed (Paris: Vuibert, 2007) at para 21; Frangois Terr6 & Philippe Simler, Les regimes matrimoniaux,
5th ed (Paris: Dalloz, 2008) at para 59.
31. Hovius & Youdan, The Law of Family Property, supra note 29 at 574.
32. Mary Ellen Turpel, "Home/Land" (1991) 10 Can J Fain L 17 at 32-33.
33. Mireille D-Castelli & Dominique Goubau, Le droit de lafamille au Qudbec, 5th ed (Sainte-Foy:
Presses de I'Universitd Laval, 2005) at 106; also Suzanne Grondin, "La protection de la residence
familiale en droit qu6b~cois" in Jacques Beaulne & Michel Verwilghen, eds, Points de droit familial!
Rencontres universitaires notariales belgo-qudbicoises (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1997) 79.
34. Civil Code Revision Office, Report XI, Report on the Protection of the Family Residence
(Montreal: 1971) at 8.
35. Janet Carsten, After Kinship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 35.
36. Carol Smart, Personal Life (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007) at 165.
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Unsurprisingly, more reticent notes temper these discussions of the
family home. In Canada, any discussion of the law and policy relating
to family homes must acknowledge the lack of recourse to protect an
aboriginal woman's interest in the matrimonial home on an "Indian
reserve."37 One author notes the character of "home" to be an "essentially
subjective phenomenon," the value of which is neither easily quantifiable
nor readily susceptible to legal proof.38 The greater the protections devoted
to the family home as shelter-the possibility of a right to occupy on
relationship breakdown, a requirement for the spouses' joint consent to its
use as collateral-the lesser its value as capital asset.39
Moreover, the diversity of contemporary family situations makes it
difficult to craft rules that will consistently implement legislative policy.
Rules may single out the family home too much, producing unintended
consequences. They may provide the means for knowledgeable spouses to
disadvantage their partners. Consider the rule in Ontario which prevents
the deduction, from a spouse's "net family property," of the value of a
matrimonial home owned by one spouse on the date of marriage.40 Though
falling short of the co-ownership of the home once proposed by the Law
Reform Commission of Ontario,41 that measure might be expected to
produce a sharing of the home's value in acknowledgement of contributions
made during the marriage by the non-owning spouse, perhaps a homemaker
wife. One obvious class disadvantaged by that policy choice consists
of women who enter a second marriage having retained, from the first,
custody of the children and title to the family home. On a further division
of property, they would be prevented from deducting from their net family
property what might be their chief pre-marriage asset. Meanwhile, their
spouses could deduct property of any other kind that they had owned on
the date of marriage.
Two final cautions against romanticizing the family home, at least
regarding the measures operative on separation. First, many families
lack the resources to maintain the family home post-breakup, precluding
37. While some commentators speak of the legislative "gap" resulting from the inapplicability of
provincial matrimonial law and the silence of the Indian Act, RSC 1985, c 1-5, Turpel, "Home/Land,"
supra note 32 at 36, insists that "[clolonial gaps are not there just to be filled" and that the solution
must be aboriginal, not federal. See also Native Women's Association of Canada, Reclaiming Our Way
of Being: Matrimonial Real Property Solutions Position Paper (2007).
38. Fox, Conceptualising Home, supra note 28 at 4.
39. Barclays Bank plc v O'Brien (1993), [1994] 1 AC 180 (HL).
40. Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3, s 4(1) "net family property" (b) [FLA (Ont)].
41. Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Family Law: Part IV: Family Property Law (1974)
at 154-55. Compare the revised view that it is "difficult to justify singling out one type of asset for
special treatment": Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Family Property Law (1993) at 81.
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sustained exclusive possession for one spouse and the children. Second,
spouses may prefer to make a fresh start in new quarters. Calls for
extending family-home protections to unmarried cohabitants must proceed
with awareness of these considerations.
Still, such calls are made. The justifications for special rules for
the homes of married couples may apply to unmarried cohabitants. In
a comparative study of the family home, it is argued persuasively that
the "policy considerations supporting non-intervention with respect to
cohabitants' assets on relationship breakdown should not apply where
the family home is concerned."42 A partial acknowledgement of this
point is discernable in the recognition by the Quebec legislature of the de
facto spouse's right to maintain occupancy of a leased dwelling after the
cessation of cohabitation or the death of the lessee spouse.43 Extension
of the occupational rights enjoyed by married spouses may be especially
appropriate in the case of unmarried cohabitees with children." Why
should an uncritically wide reading of Walsh foreclose an avenue through
which these matters might be pursued? Such is not an idle possibility.
In Charter litigation arising in Quebec, judges have inscribed the wide
reading of Walsh into the law reports. A former defacto spouse challenged,
under s. 15(1) of the Charter, her exclusion from the Civil Code of
Qudbec's book on the family. While her attack included the rules on the
family residence in its sweep, the claim depended only on the obligation
of support, the family patrimony, and the default matrimonial regime. By
contrast to Walsh, the question in that litigation was whether a legislature
which had never included defacto spouses in any marital rights and duties
(although having recognized their need for shelter in connection with a
leased dwelling) could constitutionally maintain that stance of laissez-
faire. At trial, the judge rejected all elements of the challenge. Performing
42. Conway & Girard,"'No Place Like Home,"'supra note 30 at 718. On the possibility ofconstructing
a status of family home for concubines [sic] in the French context, on the basis of "I'importance du
cadre de vie, tant pour I'6tablissement de relations familiales, que pour I'6panouissement individuel
des membres de la famille," see Caroline Watine-Drouin, "Le statut du logement familial" in tudes
offertes au Doyen Philippe Simmler (Paris: Dalloz, 2006) 253 at 260.
43. Art 1938 CCQ. Unlike the regime on the family residence in the Civil Code's book on the family,
which burdens the spouse who holds the interest in the dwelling, this provision, in the chapter on lease
in the book on obligations, burdens the landlord. It affects personal rights under a lease, rather than
the real right of ownership. Nonetheless, the unified treatment of married, civil-union, and defacto
spouses in article 1938 shows legislative recognition of an inclusive notion of shared family life that
might logically extend to the book on the family.
44. Hovius & Youdan, The Law of Family Property, supra note 29 at 585. In the United Kingdom,
Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989 (UK), 1989, c 41, s 15(l), provides the possibility of the transfer
of property for a child's benefit. That might provide the adult carer of children, whether married or not,
with a home for the duration of the children's dependency.
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the widest possible reading, Hall6e J. saw Walsh as privileging freedom
and legislative choice such that the Charter did not require extending any
part of family law to unmarried cohabitants. 45
On appeal, the Quebec Court ofAppeal took up the distinction between
property and support invoked by Gonthier J. in Walsh. Following the wide
reading, the Court viewed that authority as validating the restriction to
married couples of all property matters, including the family residence.
The crux of the reasoning was that the Supreme Court in Walsh had held
that the freedom of choice to marry was "primordial" in relation to married
spouses' property relations. 46 In evidence of the wide reading's traction,
the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Walsh was distinguishable
regarding parts of Quebec's law of matrimonial property. It deployed
an umbrella category, "le partage des biens," which on the face of the
judgment encompasses the Civil Code's default matrimonial regime of
partnership of acquests as well as regimes, from a chapter on the effects
of marriage, concerning the family residence, family patrimony, and
compensatory allowance.47 The default matrimonial regime is subject to
contractual derogation.48 In contrast, the effects of marriage are obligatory,
a characteristic reasonably interpreted as revealing a legislative policy
focused more on protection than on liberty.4 9 The Court of Appeal
nevertheless viewed Walsh as affirming the constitutionality of all property
provisions. 0
The Court proceeded to strike down de facto spouses' exclusion
from the obligation of support in article 585. That provision stipulates a
reciprocal support duty for married or civil-union spouses as well as for
parents and children. The majority judges identified that duty's objective
as providing the resources necessary to satisfy the needs of members of
"la cellule familiale." From that angle, a couple's marital status did not
change the need for support. Furthermore, the inclusion of spousal and
45. Droit de lafamille-091768,2009 QCCS 3210, [2009] RJQ 2070 at paras 242,243, 249,263 and
264.
46. Droit de lafamille-102866, 2010 QCCA 1978, [2010] RJQ 2259 at para 59, leave to appeal to
SCC granted (sub nom Quebec (Procureurgendral) cA), [2011] 1 SCR ix. For exploration of Walsh in
the context of Quebec civil law, see Robert Leckey, "Cohabitation and Comparative Method" (2009)
72 Mod L Rev 48.
47. Respectively, arts 448-484, 401-413, 414-426, 427-430 CCQ.
48. Art 432 CCQ. See generally Brigitte Lefebvre, Les rigimes matrimoniaux: Contrat de mariage,
separation de biens, socidtd d'acquits (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 2011).
49. Art 391 CCQ. For argument that the criterion of solemnization mismatches the protective posture
of Quebec family law, see Benoit Moore, "Variations chromatiques: Funion de fait entre noir et blanc"
in Gdndrosa Bras Miranda & Benoit Moore, eds, Melanges Adrian Popovici: Les couleurs du droit
(Montreal: Th6mis, 2010) 97 at 114-23.
50. Droit de lafamille-102866, supra note 46 at para 59.
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child support in a single provision made it easier to reject the contention
that support's basis was consensual or contractual, rather than social. For
the majorityjudges, distinguishing by marital status appeared to perpetuate
the idea of defacto spouses as less worthy than married and civil-union
spouses of the means to satisfy basic needs after family breakdown."
Although the plaintiff's claim did not directly bear on the regime of the
family residence, that judgment shows the view of matrimonial property
as an indivisible category for Charter purposes to be taking root.
It remains to be seen whether, in the final stage, the Supreme Court
of Canada will distinguish those articles of the Civil Code pertinent to the
initial claim from those that are not, including the family residence. In her
application for leave to appeal, the claimant continued to cast her attack so
widely as to include the provisions on the family residence.52
If timing allows, this paper might speak to the judges of the
Supreme Court resolving the de facto spouses' appeal from Quebec. It
would counsel restraint, to pronounce only on those matters in issue and
supported by a factual record of the law's impact on a claimant. If the
Supreme Court retains the wide reading of Walsh and affirms the Court of
Appeal regarding "le partage des biens," the paper's point would be that
any overbroad statements on the general category of property rights are
appropriately read down to the scope of the live issues. Reference to the
family home would be obiter.
The final contextual point concerns the Supreme Court of Canada's
judgment in Kerr v. Baranow." Disposing of appeals concerning two pairs
of former cohabitants, Cromwell J.'s lengthy reasons address five main
issues. Two are germane for present purposes. First, echoing legislative
recognition of marriage as a form of partnership,5 4 Kerr recognizes the
legal-rather, equitable-significance of a "joint family venture." Second,
the judgment rejects the notion that a monetary award reversing unjust
enrichment must be calculated on a quantum meruit or fee-for-services
basis, while a constructive trust can effectively transfer property's increase
in value. Working out the judgment's impact will take years, but optimistic
readers hope that it might have substantially addressed the financial
51. Ibidat paras 101, 104, 108 and 127.
52. Avis de demande d'autorisation d'appel de la demanderesse [publication ban], File No 33990
(29 December 2010) at 2. The constitutional question stated by the Supreme Court includes the
provisions on the family residence (arts 401-413 CCQ) that were extraneous to the financial relief
sought at trial: "Do arts. 401 to 430, 432, 433, 448 to 484 and 585 of the Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q.
1991, c. 64, infringe s. 15(l) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?" (Supreme Court of
Canada, Bulletin ofProceedings, 2011 at 852-53).
53. 2011 SCC 10, [2011] 1 S.C.R.269 [Kerr].
54. FLA (Ont), supra note 40, preamble; also art 396 CCQ.
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situation of many cohabitants on relationship breakdown. Has it rendered
Walsh irrelevant? Procedurally, making a claim in unjust enrichment
remains onerous. Furthermore, such a monetary claim does nothing to
address the needs for shelter and stability recognized by legislation for
married spouses. It remains necessary to contend with Walsh.
III. The family home as undecided
Although the Supreme Court of Canada, on the face of Walsh, answered a
constitutional question regarding the definition of "spouse" vis-d-vis the
entire MA, the best reading casts the judgment's reach more narrowly. The
proposition that the majority reasons considered and affirmed the validity
of excluding unmarried couples from protective rules on the family home
should be rejected. Whether one focuses on the legal propositions viewed
by the judge as necessary," the legal rule applied and acted on by the
court,5 6 or the rule announced by the court, if relevant to the issues raised
by the dispute," the family home falls outside the matters decided by
Walsh.
A consideration relevant to determining what a judgment has decided
might be the basis on which the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.
The Attorney General of Nova Scotia's ground in seeking leave was that
the Court of Appeal had erred by declaring s. 2(g) invalid and "thereby
extending marital property rights to unmarried cohabitants." 8 The
application emphasized the "presumptive property share on separation."S9
The Supreme Court granted leave on the same basis, namely, whether
the Court of Appeal had erred "by declaring s. 2(g) of the Matrimonial
Property Act of no force and effect, and thereby extending married property
rights to unmarried cohabitants." 60 The seeds of the wide reading of the
Supreme Court's eventual judgment are already planted by the assumption
that s. 2(g) stands or falls in relation to the full statute's "married property
rights." It would have been possible to focus argument on the provision
impeding Walsh's initial claim, s. 2(g) as it related to the division of
55. Rupert Cross & JW Harris, Precedent in English Law, 4th ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) at
49.
56. PJ Fitzgerald, Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1966) at 177.
57. Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1988) at 55.
58. Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal by the Attorney General of Nova Scotia, Nova Scotia
(Attorney General) v Walsh (1 September 2000).
59. Application for Leave to Appeal of the Attorney General of Nova Scotia, Nova Scotia (Attorney
General) v Walsh (1 September 2000) at para 1; also at para 14 [Leave Application].
60. Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings, 2001 at 284 [reference omitted].
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assets.6 1 Admittedly, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada is
granted by panels of three without reasons and it is impossible to know the
view of the judges granting it.
An important factor is the extent to which the written submissions
and the hearing canvassed the issue. Written arguments focused on the
"presumptive property share on separation," 6 2 although the respondent,
Walsh, briefly noted the possibility of an order for exclusive possession of
a matrimonial home.63 During the hearing, Bastarache J. queried whether
it was possible to isolate one aspect of the relationship covered by the
MPA or whether it should be viewed as an ensemble. Counsel for the
appellant insisted that the case was not about the matrimonial home, to
which the parties had held joint title. Beyond that, counsel's answer is
hard to follow, as other judges interrupted him. He noted that the MPA's
asset-division provisions can effectively force a person to share his or her
spouse's debts.' Counsel for the respondent later spoke about the statute's
provisions relating to exclusive possession of the matrimonial home,
emphasizing their mission to blunt the effects of family breakdown for
children. 65 These materials indicate that the MPA's several effects were
before the Court, but do not speak of the thoroughness with which the
reasons address them.
Although equivocally, the majority reasons support the contention that
they bear chiefly on asset division. Attention to the reasons flows from
the view that judicial "processes of reasoning" matter more than "their
verbal formulations."6 6 The majority judges framed the appeal at the outset
broadly enough to encompass the separate issues (A and B): "The question
before this Court, then, is whether the exclusion from the MPA of unmarried
cohabiting persons of the opposite sex is discriminatory." 67 By contrast, in
the majority's summary of facts, Bastarache J. wrote more precisely that
Walsh, in addition to claiming support for herself and the children, "sought
a declaration that the Nova Scotia MPA was unconstitutional in failing to
61. The Supreme Court of Canada was imprecise in its treatment of the Court ofAppeal's declaration
that s 2(g) was invalid (Walsh CA, supra note 3 at para 85). Instead of extending matrimonial property
rights to unmarried cohabitants, the Court of Appeal's declaration would have left the MPA with no
definition of "spouse."
62. See e.g. Walsh SCC, supra note 5 (Factum of the Appellant at para 14, and Factum of the
Intervener Attorney General of Ontario at paras 33, 45).
63. Walsh SCC, supra note 5 (Factum of the Respondent at para 33 [FOR]).
64. Walsh SCC, supra note 5 (Oral Argument, Appellant at 24-25).
65. Walsh SCC, supra note 5 (FOR, supra note 63 at 103).
66. Robert A Samek, "The Dynamic Model of the Judicial Process and the Ratio Decidendi of a
Case" (1964) 42 Can Bar Rev 433 at 447.
67. Walsh SCC, supra note 5 at para 2.
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furnish her with the presumption, applicable to married spouses, of an
equal division of matrimonial property." 68
As a further sign that the majority judges' attention to the entirety of
the MPA was fleeting, the "Relevant Statutory Provisions" section of the
judgment reproduces only the definition of "spouse" in s. 2(g) and the
entitlement to apply for equal division of matrimonial assets in s. 12(l).69
True, texts on precedent do not hold out the provisions reproduced in a
judgment as a guide to what a case decided. But that editorial selection
hints at the provisions considered by the judges, as well as at the scope
of the principle that readers in sister jurisdictions might be expected to
discern for their analogous regimes.
Crucially, statements at the heart of the analysis in Walsh concern only
asset division. The majority judges contrasted the challenged legislation
with an alternative route for an unmarried cohabitant under the general
private law. An unmarried cohabitant, they noted, may attempt to invoke
the doctrine of unjust enrichment and seek the remedy of the constructive
trust."o The view of that avenue as an alternative focuses on property
as value, not shelter. In a way that captures division of assets but not
protection of shelter, Bastarache J. refused to accept "that the decision to
live together, without more, is sufficient to indicate a positive intention to
contribute to and share in each other's assets and liabilities."'
While the judges were aware that the challenge to the MPA, as framed,
called into issue provisions regarding the matrimonial home, written and
oral canvassing of those provisions was scattered and cursory. A precedent
sub silentio is not authoritative, and the question of a possible order for
exclusive possession might be regarded as sub silentio. If it was not quite
"not perceived by the court or present to its mind," the family home was
nevertheless "not argued or considered by the court," taking those verbs
robustly.72
Meanwhile, is there a counter-argument that the rules on property
division and on the family home are inseparable, canvassed separately or
not? On the view of the judgment as having decided issues [A+ B], might
asset division be shorthand for a complex ensemble, making it mistaken
to seek separate discussion? The majority noted that whilst the respondent
focused on the right to apply for a presumptive equal share of matrimonial
assets, that was "only one part of the overall scheme," which provided
68. lbid at para 4.
69. Ibid at para 8. 1 owe this observation to Alexander Steinhouse.
70. Ibid at para 61.
71. Ibid at para 54.
72. Fitzgerald, Salmond on Jurisprudence, supra note 56 at 153-55.
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"other significant benefits" and imposed "significant obligations." 3 Those
judges knew that it might be wrong to slice up a composite scheme of
rights and obligations or otherwise connected provisions with the knife
of constitutional remedies. For example, it would be unjust for a court to
extend the right to equal division of assets to a new class of adult partners
without extending the judicial discretion to depart from that presumption.
Yet, however complementary their objectives, the rules on asset division
and on the family home are separable. Often the benefit or detriment of
both would accrue to the same partner. One is not the quid pro quo for
the other in bargaining from a fictitious matrimonial original position.
Moreover, the view of a unified category of "matrimonial property," such
that rejecting Walsh's claim affirmed the constitutionality of excluding
unmarried couples from rules on the family home, presents serious
difficulties.
IV. Unbundling matrimonial property
Turning from largely procedural discussion, the argument is now,
substantively, that the family home as shelter is rightly separated from
property as economic value. Social congruence and systematic consistency,
factors relevant to construing precedent under the common law,74 militate
against treating rules on the family home and on asset division as a
whole. While rules dividing assets or equalizing their value are property-
based, protections of home as shelter are alimentary in character. The
idea that Nova Scotia's MPA is an indivisible ensemble for Charter
purposes emerges through three major contrasts: property versus support;
entitlement versus individualized discretion; and individual contract versus
social objectives. Those contrasts are too unstable, however, to underpin
constitutional law in the province in which the litigation arose. Alert to the
potential for interprovincial variation in family law-the natural upshot
of the provinces' exclusive competence in respect of property and civil
rights in the province1-this part observes that those contrasts are still less
satisfactory in some sister provinces. The wide reading of the judgment
reflects too parochially the contingencies of the statute book of Nova
Scotia for it to establish a Charter principle of national application.
The opposition between matrimonial property and support is
discernable in several places. The design choice of the legislative
drafters in Nova Scotia implies a separation between the provisions on
73. Walsh SCC, supra note 5 at para 48.
74. Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law, supra note 57 at 52. Professional literature may
assist in shedding light on the rule best viewed as emerging from a precedent (at 119).
75. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 92(13), reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5.
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matrimonial property confided to the MPA and those, available to married
and unmarried couples, in the Maintenance and Custody Act. In Walsh,
the majority judges contrasted the province's extension of spousal support
to unmarried cohabitants with its regime of matrimonial property,' 6 and
Gonthier J., concurring, explicated their conceptual differences? The
opposition between matrimonial property and support is, arguably, implicit
in the contrast between the majority outcome in Walsh and a judgment,
three years prior, which had struck down the definition of "spouse" in
Ontario's support regime for failing to include same-sex couples." It
underlies the Parliament of Canada's bankruptcy legislation, which
liberates a discharged bankrupt from a debt serving to equalize family
assets but not from a debt for support."
While matrimonial property and support are conceptually distinct,
a rule or institution's form may belie its substantive characterization
in relation to them. A rule may thus bear on property while still being
alimentary in substance. In the contemporary context, the contrast between
property and support operates against a backdrop of legislation introduced
after Murdoch v. Murdoch." But older rules, which affected property with
the aim, not of allocating the proceeds of shared labours, but of protecting
a potentially vulnerable partner, rightly inform the characterization of the
family home as shelter. The historical backdrop includes rules at common
law regarding dower and curtesy,"' as well as tenancy by the entireties, the
unseverable tenancy ascribed by the common law to a husband and wife
to whom property was conveyed such that strangers would have taken it
as joint tenants. It also encompasses homestead legislation, protective of a
wife during the marriage and after her husband's death, which dates from
the early twentieth century.82 Indeed, scholars in the 1980s drew on these
resources in grappling with the post-Murdoch legislation protecting the
family home."
76. Walsh SCC, supra note 5 at para 60.
77. Ibid at paras 203, 204.
78. M vH, [1999] 2 SCR 3.
79. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3, ss 178(1)(b), (c).
80. Murdoch v Murdoch (1973), [1975] 1 SCR 423.
81. Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) at 188-90.
82. MC Cullity, "Property Rights during the Subsistence of Marriage" in D Mendes da Costa, ed,
Studies in Canadian Family Law, vol I (Toronto: Butterworths, 1972) 179 at 224-29.
83. Jane Matthews Glenn, "Tenancy by the Entireties: A Matrimonial Regime Ignored" (1980) 58
Can Bar Rev 711 (suggesting that rules on the family home constituted, without naming it as such, a
tenancy by the entireties); Ernest Caparros, Les rigimes matrimoniaux au Quebec, 3d ed (Montreal:
Wilson & Lafleur, 1985) at para 51 (highlighting the connections between homestead legislation and
Quebec's regime of the family residence).
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With this history borne in mind, it becomes apparent that in Nova
Scotia and other provinces, the family home falls on the side of support.
The general rule of matrimonial property in Canadian jurisdictions, in
relation to a deferred sharing of gains, is that during the union the spouses
have considerable freedom to deal with their property.84 Rules operative
on the family home during the spouses' shared life depart from the general
logic of matrimonial property in order to preserve it as shelter. Consider
the constraints on the powers of a spouse to charge or dispose of his
interest, whatever its nature, in the family home." Subject to protections
for innocent third parties, the schemes contemplate that dealings without
the other spouse's consent may be set aside.86 Protection of the possessory
right of the spouse without title may also include enjoyment of the same
right of redemption or relief against forfeiture as the spouse who holds
title." Such measures safeguard the possessory right, during consortium,
of the spouse who does not hold title." In Quebec, the legislative protection
of the family residence extends to the movable property "serving for the
use of the household." The consent of the other spouse is thus required for
a spouse to alienate, hypothecate, or remove such property from the family
residence, 9 on pain of an application for annulment of the unauthorized
dealing.90 The other spouse's right to give or withhold consent constitutes
a serious impediment to the capacity of the spouse holding the interest in
the family home to dispose of his property, although it does not amount, in
civilian parlance, to a real right.9' In addition, the freedom to manage one's
84. Constraints include the prohibition against unilateral disposition of acquests inter vivos except
for "property of small value and customary presents" (art 462, para I CCQ) and the mechanism for
premature equalization of family property in the event of one spouse's "improvident depletion" of her
net family property (FLA (Ont), supra note 40, s 5(3)).
85. See e.g. FLA (Ont), ibid, s 21. While "interest" in Ontario's scheme embraces matrimonial
homes that are leased and otherwise held, not only owned (ibid, s 21(1)), the Civil Code of Qudbec
dedicates rules to the spouse who is lessee of the family residence (art 403), owner of an immovable
with fewer than five dwellings (art 404), and owner ofan immovable with five dwellings or more (art
405), as well as to the spouse who is a usufructuary, emphyteutic lessee, or user in respect of the family
residence (art 406).
86. FLA (Ont), ibid, s 23(d); arts 403, para 2; 404, para 2; 405, para 2 CCQ. A spouse not having
given consent may also claim damages from the other spouse: art 408, CCQ.
87. FLA (Ont), ibids 22.
88. Hovius & Youdan, The Law ofFamily Property, supra note 29 at 626. The intention to protect the
home as shelter only so long as consortium endures emerges from the contrast, in Ontario's legislation,
between a purported release of possessory rights in a matrimonial home in a marriage contract, which
is unenforceable, and the enforceable release of rights in a separation agreement: FLA (Ont), ibid
s 21(1)(b).
89. Art 401, para 1 CCQ. The legislature has specified that movable property serving for the
household's use includes property "destined to furnish the family residence or decorate it; decorations
include pictures and other works of art, but not collections." Art 401, para 2, CCQ.
90. Art 402, para I CCQ.
91. Pineau & Pratte, Lafamille, supra note 25 at 151, n 420.
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property would normally include the choice to select the form in which it is
held. Where a spouse holds an interest in the family home in joint tenancy
with someone other than the other spouse, however, that interest may be
deemed severed immediately prior to the death of the first spouse. 92 Note
that the legislated constraints on the title holder's prerogatives relate only
to the family home. The legislature does not require consent of the other
spouse for all decisions foreseeably having a major financial impact on the
family, such as sale of a business or resignation from a job. Instead, the
measures discussed here underscore the singularity of home.
Rules that have their effect after the spouses' separation fortify the
view of the family home as grounded in support. Consider the question
of time. Regimes on the division of assets generally limit the sharing by
spouses to the increase in wealth during the marriage. Such is the effect
of deductions from net family property of assets owned by a spouse at
the date of marriage and the valuation of relevant assets on separation. 93
But rules on the family home reveal a different temporal orientation.
Ontario's rule preventing deduction of the value of a matrimonial home
owned before the marriage extends the sharing further, for that asset
only, before the date of marriage. Use of prior-owned property as a
family home mandates its sharing between the spouses, thus translating
a social judgment of the family home's significance-its ineluctably joint
character-that is irreconcilable with corrective justice. As for orders
for exclusive possession of the home, the period relevant to the judge's
discretion follows separation, as it does for support. Qualifications may
be necessary-exceptionally, division of property may look forward to
each spouse's needs for self-sufficiency,94 and the compensatory strand of
support looks back.95 But they do not undermine the general point.
Some enactments make plain the family home's alimentary vocation.
Orders for support may include a right to possession of a matrimonial
92. FLA (Ont), supra note 40, s 26(l).
93. For a clear retrospective orientation on equalization of family property, see Ontario's regime,
with its fixed valuation date and relatively restrictive list of factors permitting unequal variation, all
of which relate to the parties' past (ibid ss 4(1) "valuation date," 5(6); but see Serra v Serra, 2009
ONCA 105, 93 OR (3d) 161). Compare judicial discretion to award unequal shares on the basis of
post-valuation changes in value: Family Law Act, SPEI 1995, c 12, s 6(6).
94. Family Relations Act, RSBC 1996, c 128, s 65(l)(e).
95. Moge v Moge, [1992] 3 SCR 813.
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home, in the case of rules limited to married couples," or, where the rule
also applies to unmarried cohabitants, of a residence." The criteria for
a support order differ from those applicable to an occupancy order for
married spouses. Nevertheless, in Ontario an interim or final support order,
obtainable by an unmarried cohabitant, may require the transfer of property
to a dependant, absolutely, for a term of years or-more drastically-for
life.98 The connection between the provision of shelter and the performance
of an obligation of support is evident in the Civil Code of Qubbec's
contemplation that a debtor of support may, "if circumstances permit," be
dispensed from paying all or part of the support if he "offers to take the
creditor of support into his home." 99 While circumstances are presumably
favourable more often in the case of support owed to a child or parent than
to an estranged spouse, the conceptual link persists. Less expansively, but
still in derogation from the general law of property, in Nova Scotia an
order for maintenance of a common-law partner may provide for a right to
occupy or use the family residence pending determination of the partners'
rights in it.'oo
Counter-examples that would bolster the view of the family home as
property, not support, are answerable. One is that the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal interprets the MPA as calling for the resolution of property issues
at trial to terminate the joint tenancy and possession of the matrimonial
home.o'0 But a provincial appellate court's practice cannot establish
that asset division and possessory rights are inseparable as a nationally
applicable proposition. Another is the Supreme Court of Canada's
holding, in the divorce context, that an order for exclusive possession of
the matrimonial home is "relevant to support" but "not in and of itself
a support order."' 02 That is, an order for support under the Divorce Act
and an order for exclusive possession of a matrimonial home under
provincial legislation-for which there is no authorization in the federal
96. MPA, supra note 12, ss 34(1)(d), 24(l); see similarly Family Services Act, SNB 1980, c F-2.2, s
I 16(1)(d). Beyond the enacted letter of the law, judicial practice may confirm the alimentary character
of the family home. Case law in Nova Scotia shows a "clear pattern of allowing a postponement of the
equal division of the home on divorce if the custodial parent wishes to remain there and it is financially
feasible" (Conway & Girard, "No Place Like Home," supra note 30 at 723). On other provinces, see
ibid at 723, n 26.
97. Family Law Act, RSNL 1990, c F-2, s 40(l)(d).
98. .FLA (Ont), supra note 40, s 34(1)(c).
99. Art 592.
100. Maintenance and Custody Act, supra note 12, s 7. See also Family Relations Act, supra note 94,
s 124.
101. MacLennan v MacLennan, 2003 NSCA 9,212 NSR (2d) 116. I am indebted to Rollie Thompson
for alerting me to this practice.
102. Lamb v Lamb, [1985] 1 SCR 851 at 858.
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legislation-do not conflict so as to trigger the doctrine of paramountcy.o3
Lamb is appropriately read as reflecting the practical concerns that militate
against finding that a support order under the federal law should render
inoperative an order for occupancy under provincial law. The conclusion,
for federalism purposes, that there was no conflict need not undermine the
alimentary character of measures protecting the family home.
Next comes the contrast between the automatic entitlement to the
division of matrimonial property and the individualized discretion of other
legal avenues. Referring to the support regime open to unmarried cohabitants
in Nova Scotia, the majority judges in Walsh noted a court's power to
consider "a host of factors" regarding the parties' relationship as well as
their needs and circumstances.104 They contrasted the blunt presumption
of equal division of property with the equitable law of constructive trust,
which can be "tailored" to the parties' circumstances. 0 This contrast's
usefulness is questionable. In the light of variations in legislative drafting
and judicial approaches, the contrast between asset division itself and
maintenance as, respectively, automatic and discretionary is truer in some
provinces than others.106 It is sharpest where the basis for judicial departure
from the presumption of equal sharing is unconscionability' 0o-Ontario's
legislative drafters having devised their Family Law Act "to operate as
a mechanical scheme with little scope for judicial discretion"'0 -and
blurrier where it is the lower threshold of unfairness.o'0 Moreover, rules
may apply automatically and impose weighty financial consequences while
being substantively alimentary-think of the spousal veto on charging or
disposal of an interest in the family home.
Yet to the extent that the contrast holds, rules relating to possession of
the family home fall on the discretionary side. They provide that a court
may "direct that one spouse be given exclusive possession of a matrimonial
home." 0 Commentators suggest that, while legislative factors have a role
to play, "this is an area of law where hard and fast rules are inappropriate.""'
This flexibility is critical because in Walsh the majority's concerns about
103. Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2d Supp).
104. Walsh SCC, supra note 5 at para 60.
105. Ibid at para 61; see also Gonthier J, concurring, ibid at para 203.
106. Thompson, "Walsh v. Bona: Annotated," supra note 24 at 91.
107. FLA (Ont), supra note 40, s 5(6). See also the discretion to depart from equal sharing to avoid
"an injustice" (art 422 CCQ).
108. Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Family Property Law, supra note 41 at 59.
109. Family Relations Act, supra 94, s 65(1).
110. MPA, supra note 12, s lI(1)(a); see similarly FLA (Ont), supra note 40, ss 5(l), 24(l)(b); arts
416, para 1, 410 CCQ.
11l. Hovius & Youdan, The Law of Family Property, supra note 29 at 609 [footnote omitted].
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choice turned on their characterization of the regime's onerousness,
namely, its automatic and "dramatic" alteration of cohabitants' rights and
duties under the general private law."2 There might be a constitutionally
significant difference between the permanent loss of one-half of the value
of a pool of assets and the effect of an order, justified by evidence, granting
one's former partner and children temporary exclusive possession of the
dwelling that all had once shared.
The final line of characterization by which the family home appears
as support arises from the concurring judge's juxtaposition of matrimonial
property as arising from the contract of marriage and support as emerging
from legislation pursuing a social objective. Protective rules on the family
home distance it from contract. They carry out, instead, a logic of social
objectives. Rules in the common-law provinces and territories permit
spouses to vary or opt out of asset division by a prenuptial agreement."'
But Ontario's regime, at least, shields the family home."4 Furthermore,
the factors by which judges exercise the discretion to order exclusive
possession of a family home are social ones. They include children's
welfare, the inadequacy of alternative shelter, and the spouses' respective
financial positions."' Alimentary in character, these factors are redolent
of distributive justice. As for the factors conditioning unequal division of
property, while they vary from province to province, they hint at a harder-
nosed corrective justice. Such an orientation, consistent with the general
law of property and obligations, is discernable in references to wrongdoing
or improvidence."16
The pursuit of social objectives through rules on the family home
is further manifest in legislative attention to the problem of violence.
In Ontario, a court determining whether to make an order for exclusive
possession shall consider "any violence committed by a spouse against
the other spouse or the children.""' In Quebec, a lessee may resiliate
a residential lease "if, because of the violent behaviour of a spouse or
former spouse or because of a sexual aggression, even by a third party,
112. Walsh SCC, supra note 5 at para 43.
113. Hartshorne v Hartshorne, 2004 SCC 22, [2004] 1 SCR 550.
114. FLA (Ont), supra note 40, s 52.
115. MPA, supra note 12, s 11(4); FLA (Ont), ibid, s 24(3).
116. See e.g. FLA (Ont), ibid, s 5(6)(a), (b), (d); art 422 CCQ. On "economic faults," see MTv J-YT,
2008 SCC 50, [2008] 2 SCR 781 at para 28. Compare the more textured discretion for reallocation
enjoyed by courts in British Columbia and Nova Scotia: Family Relations Act, supra note 94, s 65(1);
MPA, ibid, s 13.
117. FLA (Ont), ibid, s 24(3)(f).
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the safety of the lessee or of a child living with the lessee is threatened."11
In other jurisdictions, statutes dedicated to domestic violence provide
the possibility of short-term exclusive possession of a dwelling without
regard for the law of property or contract. Whether labelled as "victims"
or "claimants," unmarried cohabitants are potential beneficiaries of those
regimes. 119
Two further considerations militate in favour of separating the family
home from asset division. One is that the functional equivalents invoked
in efforts to compensate for the unavailability of rules at the disposal of
married spouses come from different corners of the law. Claims for a share
of assets are framed, under the general law of obligations, in terms of
undeclared partnership,120 or unjust enrichment.12' By contrast, in Quebec,
attempts to stay in the family home in situations not contemplated by the
Civil Code draw on the best interests of children, 2 2 a point consistent with
the characterization of the family home's vocation as alimentary.123 The
doctrinal differences of these alternative avenues undermine the unity
implied by the purview of Nova Scotia's MPA.
The other consideration is variation across the respective regimes of
Nova Scotia and the other provinces. Provincial and territorial matrimonial-
property statutes have been described collectively as differing "markedly
118. Art 1974.1 CCQ. On the legislative "transfer of the social cost of protecting the economically
vulnerable lessee" to the lessor, see Jean-Maurice Brisson & Nicholas Kasirer, "Note to the 2006-2007
Edition" in Jean-Maurice Brisson & Nicholas Kasirer, eds, Civil Code of Qudbec: A Critical Edition,
14th ed (Cowansville: Yvon Blais; 2006) xvi at xvi.
119. Protection Against Family Violence Act, RSA 2000, c P-27, ss 1(l)(a), (d), 2(3); The Domestic
Violence and Stalking Act, CCSM c D.93, ss 2(l)(a), 7(l)(d), 14(1)(d), 14(2); Family Violence
Protection Act, SNL 2005, c F-3.1, ss 4(l), 6; Domestic Violence Intervention Act, SNS 2001, c 29, ss
2, 8(1); Victims of Family Violence Act, RSPEI 1988, c V-3.2, ss 1(d), (q), 4(3); Victims of Domestic
Violence Act, SS 1994, c V-6.02, ss 2(a), 3(3)(a). Alva Orlando, "Exclusive Possession of the Family
Home: The Plight of Battered Cohabitees" (1987) 45 UT Fac L Rev 153.
120. Beaudoin-Daigneault v Richard, [ 1984] 1 SCR 2; art 2250 CCQ.
121. Peter v Beblow, [1993] 1 SCR 980; B (M) v L (L), [2003] RDF 539, 231 DLR (4th) 665 (CA);
Kerr, supra note 53.
122. Raymonde LaSalle, "Les conjoints de fait et le droit d'usage de la r6sidence familiale" in Barreau
du Qudbec, Service de la formation permanente, ed, Congrbs annuel du Barreau du Qudbec (1997)
(Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 1997) 347.
123. Robert Leckey, "Family outside the Book on the Family" (2009) 88 Can Bar Rev 541 at 572-73.
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in content and approach." 24 In Ontario, the claim for a share of assets,
despite an exclusionary definition of "spouse," would have required
greater reflection in framing the constitutional question. In that province,
the functional equivalents of Nova Scotia's MPA and Maintenance and
Custody Act appear mostly in the Family Law Act. The parts on family
property and on the matrimonial home apply to married spouses. The
part on support obligations extends the definition of "spouse" to include
cohabitants. In M v. H., relating to same-sex couples, the Supreme Court
of Canada had already struck down the extended definition of "spouse"
for purposes of spousal support in proceedings involving neither asset
division nor the family home.
In Ontario, then, Susan Walsh's claim for division of assets need only
have challenged the definition of "spouse" in relation to the part on family
property. Where the definition of "spouse" for the part on support had been
struck down once, it would have been obvious that definitions of "spouse"
are context-specific and may separately undergo Charter scrutiny within a
single instrument. A finding that the restrictive definition of "spouse" was
constitutionally valid for the purposes of the part on family property could
have left the matter open for the part on the matrimonial home. Similarly,
in Quebec the "family residence," including the possibility of a right to
its use, is treated in one section of the chapter on the effects of marriage.
Partition of the value of "residences of the family," in pursuit of a wholly
different objective, is addressed in a subsequent chapter.'25
This observation of interjurisdictional variation is critical. In the
national context, the claim is not that the meaning implied by the structure
of Ontario's statute or of the Civil Code of Qudbec should prevail over
that of Nova Scotia's. But neither should the contingent choices of Nova
Scotia's legislative drafters define the Charter's import for all Canadian
jurisdictions. Comparative study of the functionally equivalent regimes of
various legislatures, as undertaken by this paper, may help to demarcate
substance from form so as to yield a more solid interpretation of the
124. Payne & Payne, Canadian Family Law, supra note 18 at 566. Provincial variations include
the measure of judicial discretion (see note 93 above and text accompanying notes 107 to 109) and
the pool of assets, including whether an asset becomes subject to sharing on account of its use "for
a family purpose" (Family Relations Act, supra note 94, s 58(2)) or its origin in the spouses' joint
efforts during their marriage (FLA (Ont), supra note 40, s 4(1) "net family property" (b)). Another is
whether the regime confers a proprietary interest in each asset or provides for an unsecured claim for
an equalization payment. For illustration of the latter design choice's implications on bankruptcy of
the spouse who is debtor of an equalization payment, see Schreyer v Schrever, 2011 SCC 35, [2011]
SCJ no 35.
125. Arts 401-413, 414-426 CCQ. Spouses have one "family residence" in the sense of the section on
the "family residence" (arts 395, 407 CCQ), while they may have multiple "residences of the family"
for purposes of establishment of the family patrimony and its eventual partition (art 415 CCQ).
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nationally applicable Charter principle. Admittedly, concepts or institutions
may be entwined despite their separate treatment by the common-law
and distinct statutes. It became swiftly clear that an interpretation of the
common law and of enacted rules permitting same-sex marriage entailed
an equivalently accommodating reading of the Divorce Act.126 But the link
between marriage and divorce withstands scrutiny in a way that subsuming
the family home-within matrimonial property does not.
V. The reach ofCharterjudgments
Is the prevailing reading of Walsh anomalous or does it indicate a larger
methodological tendency? It is perhaps revealing that even scholars hostile
to Walsh accepted the wide reading. Adopting a speculative register,
this part suggests that the reading of Walsh may exemplify a practice of
reading Charter judgments as legislative pronouncements, rather than of
subjecting them to the reading practices associated with the common law.
Procedural practices relating to appeals to the Supreme Court intensify the
need for such careful reading.
It is a fundamental feature of the common law, and of all legal systems
in which judges play an oracular role, that the law "should result from
being applied to live issues raised between actual parties and argued
on both sides."' 27 The idea of law arising from the adjudication of live
disputes underpins the doctrine of mootness, which counsels against
deciding a case that no longer has a direct legal impact. The traditional
view of common-law adjudication is that the components of a judgment
are separable into the ratio decidendi and obiter dictum.12 8 Much has been
written about the techniques for applying this distinction. 2 9 According to
the classical theory, only the ratio-however difficult its identification' 30 -
constrains lower and perhaps coordinate courts. What matters in the
present discussion of Walsh is not obiter in the sense of distinct statements
unnecessary to resolution of the appeal, although many of those are
present in the Supreme Court's Charter judgments. It is the appropriate
breadth or narrowness attributed to the general statements about the MPA
or matrimonial property as ensembles.
126. MMv JH(2004), 73 OR (3d) 337 (Sup Ct J); JS v CF, 2005 BCSC 1011, [2005] 11 WWR 136.
127. Fitzgerald, Salmond on Jurisprudence, supra note 56 at 177; see also Lon L Fuller, Anatomy of
the Law (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976) at 89.
128. The theory of the sources of public and adjectival law in Quebec makes Quebec judges, in this
context, classifiable as common-law judges.
129. AWB Simpson, "The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine of Binding Precedent" in AG
Guest, ed, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961) 148; Cross &
Harris, Precedent in English Law, supra note 55.
130. Neil Duxbury, The Nature andAuthority ofPrecedent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008) at 68-76.
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The wide reading of Walsh may be associated with a particular view of
the Supreme Court of Canada's power to make law by its utterances. The
rise and ostensible fall of the so-called Sellars principle is illustrative."'
The principle was that lower courts were to regard obiter dicta from the
Supreme Court as binding, and many courts purported to do so. Scholars'
and judges' willingness to accept the principle as it evolved required
ascribing to judges the authority to announce obligatory legal rules
unconnected to the resolution of disputes.'32 In R. v. Henry,"' the Supreme
Court of Canada ostensibly repudiated the Sellars principle. Justice Binnie
rejected, as incompatible with the common law's development, the idea
that "each phrase in ajudgment of this Court should be treated as if enacted
in a statute." 3 4 Yet he insisted that, while not all obiter are binding, the
Court may nevertheless intend that "effect" be given to discussion going
"beyond what was essential for the disposition of the particular case.""'
In particular, the analytical framework proposed by the Court in a Charter
judgment, such as the Oakes test,3 6 might be intended to be "binding on
other Canadian courts."
The traditional understanding of the judicial role does not contemplate
that judges should announce a "test" for applying an instrument-in this
case, the Charter-in abstract, comparatively legislative terms.' 3 Indeed,
the traditional theory of precedent holds that it is not the Court's stated (or
inferable) intent that grants a statement authority, but its function in the
disposition of a dispute. Thus even the purported repudiation of Sellars
itself required a law-making power incompatible with the traditional
common-law theory. The statements in Henry about the intended effect
of the Supreme Court's instructive discussions are themselves obiter.
The wide reading of Walsh-which takes literally the Supreme Court's
pronouncements about matrimonial property beyond the confines of the
dispute-fits into the larger tendency.
The influence of Charter judgments cautions against attributing
binding authority to statements that are unnecessary for resolving a
131. Sellars v The Queen, [ 1980] 1 SCR 527.
132. Mathieu Devinat, "L'autorit6 des obiter dicta de la Cour suprdme" (1998) 77 Can Bar Rev I at
19. On the unhappy influence of the clumsily draftled headnote in the Canadian Criminal Cases, see
ibid at 5 n 19.
133. 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 SCR 609.
134. Ibid at para 57.
135. Ibid at para 53.
136. R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103.
137. Henry, supra note 133 at para 53.
138. Robert Leckey, "Language and Judgment's Reach: Reflecting on Limits on Rights" (2010) 60
UTLJ 1031.
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dispute or needlessly broad. Charter precedents-rather, the readings of
them-influence legislative design. Proposed legislation is vetted for its
compliance with human rights in advance of its reaching the legislature.
Legislative drafters may be risk averse, inclined to give pronouncements
of unconstitutionality an unnecessarily wide berth.13 9 Conversely, the
sense from a reading of a judgment that current law complies with the
Charter may dampen reform efforts in parliamentary and judicial arenas.
The potential for Charter judgments to function not as floors but as
ceilings makes it important not to read them overbroadly. Bearing those
considerations in mind, procedural features of Charter litigation and the
Supreme Court's practice substantiate the hunch that Charter judgments
are particularly likely to require scrutiny in order to delineate what they
decided.
One procedural feature arises from the discretionary character of
appeals. The criterion of "public importance" for grant of leave may
incentivize litigants to downplay interprovincial variation.14 0 It may do so
even where the features of a statute that call for a particular Charter result
in one province may not be present in another province's functionally
equivalent regime. In the Walsh leave proceedings, the provincial
government referred to matrimonial property legislation's "pervasive
uniformity.. .across Canada," insisting the case was "not local in nature."'41
Only a winner at the provincial court of appeal would have had an interest
in disputing that argument. But Walsh's counsel did not oppose the
government's initiative to appeal, instead arguing that the province's new
law extending matrimonial property rights to declared domestic partners
continued to discriminate against undeclared cohabitants.142 The Attorneys
General of the provinces may intervene to flag up provincial specificity. If
they contend that all their legislation is valid, however, they are unlikely to
highlight the internal divisions that render some regimes more vulnerable
than others. The Chief Justice's statement of a constitutional question is
also relevant. That question-often in the form "Does s. X of law Y infringe
139. Andrew Petter, "Legalise This: The Chartering of Canadian Politics" in James B Kelly &
Christopher P Manfredi, eds, Contested Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009) 33 at 34-35. See also
Janet L Hiebert, "Governing Like Judges?" in Tom Campbell, KD Ewing & Adam Tomkins, eds,
The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)
40 at 64 ("[S]ceptics understate the extent of judicial influence on a polity because they do not give
sufficient consideration to the extensive reliance on case law in pre-legislative processes of developing
legislation").
140. Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, s 40(1).
141. Leave Application, supra note 59 at paras 11, 12.
142. Response of Susan Walsh (respondent), Application for Leave to Appeal of the Attorney General
of Nova Scotia, Nova Scotia (Attorney-General) v Walsh (4 December 2000) at 2.
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s. Z of the Charter?"-is used to notify all provincial attorneys general of
a constitutional appeal.' The question and the answer risk being taken as
what the judgment decided, although, as in Walsh, the drafting may have
reached further than necessitated by the underlying dispute.
As for judicial practice, the Supreme Court's willingness to hear moot
Charter cases and to pronounce on issues not before it heightens the need
for careful reading. It is sometimes said that facts are highly important
in Charter cases and that Charter determinations should not arrive in a
factual vacuum.144 Such statements are consistent with the common-law
tradition and with discussions of human rights as indeterminate, requiring
"specification in individual cases."' 45 Yet the justices of the Supreme
Court appear amenable to countermanding considerations, such as the
understandable supposition that an issue is unlikely to return to them soon,
for reasons of their selection and of litigation's cost. A number of key
Charter cases-Walsh being far from the only one-have emerged from
other than adversarial circumstances buttressed by a full factual record. At
times the Court has said more than the dispute necessitated.146 Interveners
may provide some context, and five Attorneys General intervened in
Walsh. There is no basis, however, for thinking that the Supreme Court has
overcome the epistemic limits that justified restraint in common-law cases.
By the time it reached the Supreme Court, Walsh was moot, and the stated
constitutional question reached beyond what would have been needed to
resolve the initial claim. Nobody's direct financial interests hung, as they
might in private litigation, on the Court's cleaving to the facts. Does that
procedural feature help account for the presence of overbroad statements
at the expense of legislative details?
Sweeping findings of unconstitutionality already attract criticism
as intrusions into the legislative process. The present example suggests
that affirmations of compliance with the Charter may also merit study,
particularly where they reach beyond the facts and issues. Legal scholarship
is not a source of law in the common law as it may be in the civil law.147 By
143. Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, ss 60, 61; Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra
note 27, vol 2 at 59-23 to 59-24.
144. Brian G Morgan, "Proof of Facts in Charter Litigation" in Robert J Sharpe, ed, Charter
Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) 159; Danson v Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] 2 SCR
1086; Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84, [2002] 4 SCR 429.
145. H Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law, 4th ed (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010) at 380 [footnote omitted].
146. Lome Sossin, Boundaries ofJudicial Review: The Law ofJusticiability in Canada (Scarborough:
Carswell, 1999) c 3.
147. Jacques Ghestin & Gilles Goubeaux with Muriel Fabre-Magnan, Traitd dedroit civil, Introduction
gindrale, 4th ed (Paris: L.G.D.J., 1994) at para 574.
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rigorously scrutinizing judgments, however, scholars have an important
contribution to make to the inter-institutional process of working out
human rights. By uncritically accepting the Supreme Court's affirmations
as binding, might not scholars abnegate the role of "academic observer" in
interpretively shaping judgments?l4 8 Scholars unhesitatingly criticize how
the Supreme Court decides Charter cases, but they discuss much less the
practices of reading that they and other jurists, including judges, should
bring to earlier judgments. The experience with Walsh gestures to such
reading practices as a promising avenue for further research.
Conclusion
Walsh is best read as having ruled on division of assets, but not on
measures protecting the family home as shelter. Accordingly, an unmarried
cohabitant, refused the possibility of opposing her partner's disposition of
a shared home to which he held title or of applying for exclusive possession
thererof, might bring a Charter challenge. To be clear, some examples
presented already assimilate unmarried to married couples. The worry
is that the wide reading of Walsh implies that legislatures have in such
cases overshot their Charter obligations. The view that Walsh immunizes
from Charter scrutiny a generic category of "statutory property rules" is
pernicious. Presumably it would follow that a future legislature might
withdraw one or more of the benefits now enjoyed by unmarried couples
with the blessing of the Charter and the Supreme Court. It is haphazard
and unprincipled to take a Charter judgment, supposedly upholding an
entire statute of one province while dismissing a claim, as affirming the
validity of all marital-status distinctions in relation to any rules bearing on
property.
Beyond the reading of Charter judgments, another observation to
draw concerns the persistence in viewing the legal attributes of conjugal
unions as a bundle. Scholars' assumption that a right to share in the value of
accumulated wealth goes together with protections of the home as shelter
bespeaks a reluctance to separate the legal effects of conjugal union and
to analyze their respective functions and justifications. It reflects a binary
"logic of semblance" by which a class of family relationships should be
treated as like or unlike marriage.149 For Charter purposes and legislative
and social policy, the diversity of contemporary family life calls for
148. Rebecca Johnson, Taxing Choices: The Intersection of Class, Gender Parenthood, and the Law
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002) at 193.
149. Anne Bottomley & Simone Wong, "Shared Households: a New Paradigm for Thinking about the
Reform of Domestic Property Relations" in Alison Diduck & Katherine O'Donovan, eds, Feminist
Perspectives on Family Law (New York: Routledge, 2006) 39 at 42.
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subjecting the bundles of rights and duties associated with marriage and
parentage to context-specific disaggregation. The all-or-nothing approach,
a modified form of which underpins the wide reading of Walsh, is too
blunt to take into account social phenomena such as people "living apart
together."s 0 It may similarly ill serve interdependent partners who do
not sustain "dyadic relationships" that "mirror the heterosexual marriage
model."'
Even the obligation of support might appropriately be unbundled.
Married spouses may owe one another post-dissolution support on
compensatory or non-compensatory bases. On the Supreme Court of
Canada's understanding, non-compensatory support flows from the social-
obligation view of marriage as "a serious commitment not to be undertaken
lightly."'52 As the legal contours of family reached beyond conjugal
relations,'53 the justifiable duties might be less onerous. A leading English
scholar of family law conjectures that in some non-marital relationships,
betrayal and loss might justify retrospective compensation, but not on-
going future support. 5 4 His musings are not directly transferable into
Canadian family law; the statutory preclusion of spousal misconduct
from consideration regarding support has-arguably-exiled betrayal
beyond law's reach even for married spouses, at least for pecuniary
purposes."' Yet they hint that compensatory support might be appropriate
in relationships where non-compensatory support would not. Of course,
as queer and feminist scholars have noted in connection with same-sex
marriage, extending family law's reach is not an unmitigated good. It is
wrong to assume that the general law of property and obligations fails
women, "but that family law does not."'"' But the disaggregation proposed
here might clarify analysis.
150. Simon Duncan & Miranda Phillips, "People Who Live Apart Together (LATs)--How Different
Are They?" (2010) 58 Sociological Review 112.
151. Simone Wong, "Caring and Sharing: Interdependency as a Basis for Property Redistribution?" in
Anne Bottomley & Simone Wong, eds, Changing Contours ofDomestic Life, Family andLaw: Caring
and Sharing (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 49 at 50-51.
152. Bracklow v Bracklow, [1999] 1 SCR 420 at para 57.
153. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, SA 2002, c A-4.5.
154. John Eekelaar, "Friendship" in J Erauw, V Tomljenovi6 & P Volken, eds, Liber Memorialis Petar
Sarievie: Universalism, Tradition and the Individual (Mfinchen: Sellier, European Law Publishers,
2006) 265 at 273-77.
155. Divorce Act, supra note 103, s 15.2(5); Leskun v. Leskun, 2006 SCC 25, [2006] 1 SCR 920.
Adultery and cruelty continue to establish the breakdown of a marriage so as to justify dissolution
(Divorce Act, s 8(2)).
156. Anne Bottomley, "From Mrs. Bums to Mrs. Oxley: Do Co-habiting Women (Still) Need
Marriage Law?" (2006) 14 Fem Legal Stud 181 at 206.
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Realistically, the odds are low that a private plaintiff will challenge
cohabitants' exclusion from statutory rules relating to the family home
as shelter. The monetary value of the rights denied may be too small, and
their period of acute relevance too fleeting, to induce litigation. This paper
might speak, then, to an associational litigant, which might join with an
individual. Or it might resonate with a government that has not reduced
its conception of family policy to the execution of judicially recognized
Charter obligations. Perhaps the present account of the scholarly
gingerliness in engaging with Walsh is best understood as an allegory
for the persistent weight on our imaginations of established categories of
family law.
